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COLTAN FROM CENTRAL AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ANY CERTIFICATION 
BEEP n° 23 
  Raimund Bleischwitz,  Monika Dittrich and Chiara Pierdicca  
 
Abstract 
The exploitation of coltan in Central Africa can be considered a case of conflict minerals due to 
its nature. Many international organizations and bodies, national governments and private 
sector organizations seek to address this conflict, in particular via transparency, certification 
and accountability along the material supply chain. This paper analyses the international trade 
dimension of coltan and gives evidence on the dimension of illicit trade of coltan. The authors 
start from the hypothesis that illicit trade of coltan sooner or later will enter the market and 
will be reflected in the statistics. The paper is structured in the following manner: first, a short 
section gives a profile of coltan production and markets; second, an overview of the mining 
situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and related actors. The third section 
addresses mechanisms, actors and measurement issues involved in the international trade of 
coltan. The final part draws lessons for certification and conflict analysis and offers some 
guidance for future research.  
The paper identifies two main possible gateways to trace illegal trade in coltan: the 
neighbouring countries, especially Rwanda, and the importing countries for downstream 
production, in particular China. Our estimation is that the value of such illicit trade comes close 
to $ 27 million annually (2009), roughly one fifth of the world market volume for tantalum 
production. With regard to any certification the paper concludes that this will become 
challenging for business and policy: (a) Central Africa currently is the largest supplier of coltan 
on the world market, many actors profit from the current situation and possess abilities to 
hide responsibility; (b) China will need to accept more responsibility, a first step would be the 
acceptance of the OECD guidelines on due diligence; (c) better regional governance in Central 
Africa comprises of resource taxation, a resource fund and fiscal coordination. An international 
task force may provide more robust data, however more research will also be needed. 
 
Keywords: coltan, certification, central africa, raw materials conflict, international trade 
JEL-Codes: F14, K42, N50, O19, Q33.
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1.  Introduction  
Coltan mining in Central Africa and especially in the Eastern Kivu region of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has often been viewed as a case for a conflict 
over the control of raw materials in a fragile state . Although the DRC see to advance in 
some key areas lately, e.g. in macro-economic management, education enrolment or 
improving drinking water supply (UNEP, 2011), it remains one of the poorest countries 
world-wide (UNDP, 2011). Rebel groups and others go on fighting over access to 
minerals and profit from illicit trade, and the state still fails to provide sufficient social 
order resulting in unchecked criminal activities. The easy access to coltan and other 
minerals, combined with weak property rights in a country with weak basic institutions 
and a long history of civil war, and a high demand on world markets can be assumed as 
main determinants of insecurity and conflicts, especially in the eastern Congo (Nest 
2011: 71ff.). 
There is a clear pledge for international action from various sides. The United Nations 
have established evidence and given recommendations by means of several Expert 
reports. The most recent one (S/2010/596) and the ensuing UN Security Council 
resolution (S/RES/1952) of late 2010 call on governments, markets and companies to 
establish sound systems of supply chain management as well as to impose asset 
freezes and travel bans for groups and individuals involved in the conflict. In a similar 
spirit, the G8 resolution of Heiligendamm has started a process to establish certified 
trading chains in minerals production (CTC); a first activity has been the development 
of a new geochemical method called ‘Analytical Finger-printing’ (AFP) since 2006 that 
will allow exact pinpointing of the extraction source of a mineral used in products. 
Initiatives have also been taken by the private sector aiming at transparency and 
improving the traceability along their supply chains. The annex of this paper contains a 
number of such initiatives. Needless to say, however, all these initiatives are voluntary, 
pledges and the few commitments are not yet implemented. The willingness to take 
serious action seems low compared with the pressing situation. However the Dodd-
Frank Act in the USA  proposes registration requirements for conflict minerals 
including coltan from that region. In Europe, the European Commission has quite 
recently introduced a similar proposal  for a country-by-country reporting for large 
listed and unlisted companies in the extractive and logging sectors.  
In order to learn more about the challenges towards transparency and certification, it 
is the intention of this paper to analyse the international trade dimension of this 
conflict. The authors acknowledge the work that has been done to analyse the regional 
conflict and to provide evidence for an involvement of different actors. Doing new 
analysis on the Kivu region how-ever is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Based on latest findings and focussing on the international trade dimension, our paper 
raises the thesis that any certification scheme is faced with a number of challenges. In 
doing so we address the following issues: What is the dimension of illicit trade? What 
actors are involved in the international supply chain? What levels of governance need 
to be addressed? With evidence on the significant amount of illicit trade and the 
heterogeneity of actors we conclude on activities that would (a) strengthen the 
institutional robustness of certification and (2) accompanying governance mechanisms 
that deem necessary.   
These issues will be addressed in the following manner: the next two sections will give 
brief and up-to-date overviews about coltan markets and the mining situation in the 
DRC. A subsequent section will deal more extensively with international trade of 
coltan. It addresses mechanisms, actors and measurement issues. The last part will 
draw lessons for certification scheme and better resource governance and offers some 
guidance for future research.  
Going beyond coltan, a study by the World Economic Forum (2011: 23) refers to illicit 
trade of minerals in general as a major geopolitical risk with a market size of some US $ 
20,000 million annually. Thus we believe that such research is of relevance and part of 
a larger agenda on resources policy, international economics and sustainable resource 
management. 
2.  Profiling coltan 
Coltan is a term commonly used to refer to columbite-tantalite, a mineral extracted in 
Central Africa and belongs to a group that is internationally known as tantalum.1 This 
element of the 5th group of the 6th period of the chemical periodical system occurs in 
the Earth crust with a share of roughly 2 ppm (parts per million), i.e. three times more 
often than silver. It has a strong geochemical coherence with niobium. The United 
States Geological Survey (USGS 2011), Roskill (2009) as well as the Tantalum-Niobium 
International Study Center (TIC) locate large reserves in Australia and Brazil, where 
new discoveries have been made in recent years. The global reserves were estimated 
to have been in the order of 110,000 t of contained tantalum in 2011 and considered 
adequate to meet projected needs. Worth noting: DRC, Rwanda and Ethiopia have not 
been included in the calculation due to lack of reliable data. 
                                                          
1
 Tantalum minerals comprise e.g. tapiolite, wodginite, ixiolite, bismutotantalite, fermsite, 
stibiotantalite, simpsonite, microlite and minerals of the complex fergusonite, aeschynite and euxenite 
mineral groups. 
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The tantalum industry, characterized by USGS (2009: 52.2) as ‘traditionally shrouded in 
secrecy’,2 is comprised of (in order of material flow) a mining component that typically 
extracts ore and produces a concentrate, a processing segment that converts 
concentrate into an oxide or metal, a parts manufacturing segment that uses the oxide 
or metal material to produce such components as capacitors or superalloys, and an 
end-product manufacturing sector that uses the parts, such as capacitors, in electronic 
devices, such as cellular telephones (USGS 2011:2). Product range features tantalum 
oxide, powder, and Tantalum Carbide (TaC). Tantalum is also produced as a byproduct 
during tin smelting. Research must use all data with caution since they may capture 
different forms of tantalum.3 
For quite a long time, Australia had dominated the world market with shares being in 
the order of 60 % or even above. The production situation has changed significantly 
over the recent years. The largest producer, Australian-based Talison (formerly Sons of 
Gwalia) has suspended its production in late 2008 due to difficulties of financing 
necessary investments and market uncertainties during the financial crisis. USGS 
(2011) estimates the production amounts for 2009 as follows: Brazil (180t), 
Mozambique (110t), Rwanda (100t) Australia (80t), Canada (25t), other countries 
(170t, including Burundi, DRC (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). 
Further supply may have been provided by others.4  
                                                          
2
 This statement is supported by the facts that there is no spot market / stock exchange price for 
tantalum and hence price transparency is low, small-scale mines of the Great Lakes Region are not yet 
documented and partly illegal, the small smelters in China are not yet monitored, trade is – as we point 
out – to a significant degree illicit, etc. Compared with other commodity markets such as copper, the 
market for coltan differs significantly! 
3
 Notice that data refer to different units. This table represents our calculation method. UN COMTRADE 
refers to ores and concentrates of tantalum, niobium and vanadium without further specification. 
Implications will be discussed. 
Unit Used in Statistics Factor 
Gross mass (metric tons) Columbite-
tantalite (Coltan) 
Countries in the Great Lakes Region, USGS 
Minerals Yearbook. Probably though not 
explicity clarified: UN Expert Group, Global 
Witness, Garrett / Mitchell  
0,25 
Tantalum content, contained tantalum 
pentoxide (Ta2O5) 
Standard commodity, used in contracts. Parts 
of International Trade statistics (UN 
COMTRADE), Chinese Import Statistics 
0,8 
Contained tantalum concentrate, 
Tantalite (Ta) 
USGS Mineral Commodities 1 
Source: Roskill (2009: 6); USGS (2011: p. 52.13): Gross mass is mass of concentrate before metal is 
extracted, assumed to be one-third Ta2O5. Content is mass of metal produced; Ta2O5 is 81,897 % 
tantalum. In general, Ta2O5 contents of ores vary from 0,1 kg/t to 10 kg/t. 
4
 Further estimations cover China (112 t), Russia (35 t), other Asian countries (57 t) as well as supply 
provided via tin slag (145 t) without changing the statement; we owe this information to Philip Schütte. 
See also Roskill (2009). 
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It is evident that in 2009 Central Africa (including Mozambique) has been a major, if not the 
largest supplier of tantalum on the world market! This situation is very likely to continue in 
2010-11. Some supply is also provided by synthetic concentrates produced from tin 
slag, which are by-products from tin smelting (7 % in 2008, Roskill 2009: 12). Secondary 
production and recycling do not play a major role yet. Within industry, 20 – 25% of 
annual production inputs result from recycling activities done along production routes 
in attempts to reduce losses and minimize waste. Any approach to closing 
international material loops and to recycle tantalum from electronic goods and other 
products however barely exists.  
 
Figure 1: Tantalum, world mine production (unit: tantalum content, Ta2O5). 
 
Sources: USGS (2011) and various other years of its tantalum report; data for 2010 preliminary. 
 Reasons are related to  
 technology issues – the shares within products are tiny, challenges of 
pulverization during dismantling processes are huge, hence a need to develop 
new recycling technologies has been expressed;5  
 economic issues - establishing collection and dismantling systems requires an 
international approach implying high upfront transaction and investment costs 
while no regulation exists; 
 
                                                          
5
 Eurometaux’s proposals for the EU’s Raw Materials Initiative as of 11th June 2010, p. 49-50 (written 
with Institute for Applied Ecology). 
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Thus, material leakage and dissipative losses are quite high. 
Market demand for tantalum has been increasing over the last 10 – 15 years. Some 60 
% of tantalum is being used for capacitors in electronic goods and devices such as 
mobile phones, pagers, PCs etc. (Roskill (2009: 110ff). The continued growth of the 
mobile phone sector in Africa, Asia, and other regions will continue to be a source of 
growth. In addition, tantalum carbide is used for high-tech cutters, in air and space 
technology, and for turbines. Future demand is expected to grow, with new 
applications in ICT, machinery, energy production turbines, energy storage, aircrafts 
and optical industry. Possible substitutes in those areas exist, such as niobium in 
carbides or rare earth elements for high temperature applications. But none of these 
possible substitutes performs as effectively as tantalum so far, they may pose other 
challenges, and rare earth elements are regarded as critical metals too. For these 
reasons, tantalum ranks in the upper right quadrant of the EU’s Raw Material 
Initiative6 where the most critical minerals are listed; its economic importance is very 
high, the supply risk must be taken serious, and the environmental dimension should 
not be overlooked.  
Thus, coltan mining in the DRC cannot be isolated from international markets and can 
hardly be focused on one application only (e.g. mobile phones). Research can transfer 
lessons from other conflict minerals, such as diamonds. However, coltan is not an end-
product in itself and the production chain is complex. Thus, the specific characteristics 
of this material need to be considered in the design of any certification scheme (see 
below).  
3.  Coltan mining in the DRC 
Due to specific geological conditions – deposits are too small to be amenable to large-
scale industrial mining –, Coltan mining in eastern DRC is mainly done as artisanal and 
small-scale mining (ASM, Garrett 2008). ASM differs considerably by mineral and 
province in terms of how the sector is governed, how the economy and society are 
structured, and the form of the mining groups. The sector is dynamic in its 
proliferation, with new ASM sites springing up regularly, frequent power shifts and 
mineral-specific reconfigurations of actors and local informal governance regimes. 
Employment is mainly for low-skilled local people. Estimations vary on the number of 
artisanal miners between 500.000 and 2 million in DRC.  
                                                          
6
 European Commission (2010): Critical raw materials for the EU. Report of the Ad-hoc Working Group 
on defining critical raw materials. See also: Annex V to the Report, pp. 188ff.   
Accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw- materials/documents/index_en.htm 
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With an average of four to five dependents for each digger, the total number of 
persons whose livelihood depends on this activity could be as high as 8 to 10 million or 
up to 16 % of the total population of DRC (World Bank 2008: Nest 2011: 17ff.). The 
majority of miners subsists on US$ 1-5 per day, and is often locked in debt to local 
traders and strongmen. Small scale miners have no legal mineral rights under the Mine 
Law (adopted 2002); instead of tax or mining license they have to buy annually a digger 
card for 25 US$ from provincial authorities. Many of the diggers cannot afford this 
amount, and at the same time government has no capacity to force the payment. 
Children are often employed too. Some mines operate on a barter economy, which 
makes it risky or impossible for miners to save and invest. Nevertheless, in many parts 
of the DRC, ASM remains the sole income opportunity. Given the lack of alternatives 
however, Garett and Lintzer (2010: 401) characterize ASM as the “safety net to 
support people and economies even under adverse circumstances”.  
DRC has quite recently (June, 2011) adopted its first environmental legislation 
including, amongst other, environmental impact studies for mining activities 
(Republique Democratique du Congo, 2011). While big companies usually have 
knowledge and financial capacities to comply with the legislation and international 
standards, ASM activity in  R  normally doesn’t follow even low environmental 
standards. ASM, for example, also takes place in the lowland sector of  ahuzi  i ga 
National Park, one of the last resorts of mountain gorillas worldwide. The national park 
is listed as World Heritage Site in Danger, UNESCO reports that only few areas are 
covered by patrols (UNESCO, 2008 and 2011).  
As indicated by a study on the mining sector in DRC (World Bank 2008), the polluting 
effects of this artisanal activity include possible decadence of unsafe mine tailings and 
waste dumps, water pollution caused by acid mine drainage, improper closure of pits 
and mines, dumping of toxic effluent into the water, mining waste, etc. Landscape 
alterations such as forest clearance and cutting of timber and firewood are serious and 
often irreversible, with secondary effects on local agriculture, fishery and forestry that 
is devastating if small scale farmers hire themselves out as diggers (Nest 2011: 49). 
In addition to the environmental consequences directly and indirectly caused by 
mining, the presence of armed groups and their control over several areas can 
aggravate the destruction of natural habitats. In fact, the armed groups don’t limit 
themselves to profit from the extraction of minerals, but they finance themselves 
through the illegal exploitation of other natural resources too (minerals such as gold, 
cassiterite, tungsten and other natural resources such as timber trade, meat, illegal 
fishing and poaching, UN 2010). Focusing regulation on one issue thus gives incentives 
to shifting illegitimate activities rather than abandoning them. 
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There is robust evidence on how rebel groups are profiting from the minerals 
extraction and trade. Of the 13 major mines, 12 are said to be controlled by armed 
groups (Nathan / Sarkar 2010: 22). The weakness of  R ’s institutions and the lack of 
an effective and sufficiently paid national army, are responsible for the proliferation of 
military groups, which replace this vacuum with alternative forms of governance. ASM 
is often controlled by small, locally-based armed groups or militias, collectively called 
the mai mai. The larger armed units and the mai mai both “tax” the mines directly and 
indirectly extort money or minerals at the check-points they control.  
Especially two groups, the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), a 
political movement with a military wing called the Congolese National Army (CNA), and 
the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) have been investigated by 
UN Expert Panels. CNDP presence is limited to few coltan mines. The Bibatama Coltan 
mine e.g. is owned by a national senator who seems to accept the presence of the 
CNDP and pays a price of $0.20/kg exported at checkpoints. FDLR, on the contrary, has 
been present in the two Kivus for at least 14 years. The group can count on a strong 
business network that enables the militia to receive the supplies needed, including 
weapons. The UN panel estimates that FDLR is reaping profits worth millions of dollars 
a year from trade of minerals in eastern DRC. For these relations they are described as 
“les grands commerçants” and they often involve  ongolese civilians that are forced to 
act or trade on their behalf.  
More in general, the typologies of involvement of these armed groups in the mineral 
trade can vary, including taxation, payment of protection fees, commercial 
involvement in the mining activity and pillage.7 Worth noting, that these groups also 
profit from other minerals such as gold and cassiterite. 
The recent UN report (S/2010/596) establishes evidence on the involvement of the 
Congolese national army. Congolese army units are competing among themselves for 
control over mineral-rich areas; they collude with armed groups in order to attack rival 
commanders, and they have gained control over large areas rich in natural resources in 
North and South Kivu provinces. In Walikale territory, the part of North Kivu richest in 
cassiterite (tin ore), control of the minerals trade was “awarded” to the  N P to 
encourage it to integrate into the Congolese army, as agreed in an early-2009 peace 
deal. Though the formal army in the DRC is paid, the payment is just low, so the 
challenge is about the magnitude of payment and incentives for additional sources of 
income. 
 
                                                          
7
 See OECD (2010: 20f), UN report 2010 S/2010/596, pp.48-49 and UN S/2008/773, paras 73 and 779 for 
a more detailed description. 
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This situation of increasing involvement of armed groups in mineral trade and the 
difficulty of getting rid of it has been used as official justification by the Government of 
DRC for its temporary freeze in the mining activities of the provinces of South and 
North Kivu and Maniema on 11 September 2010 (UN 2010). The consequences of this 
action on production are still unknown. The UN claims that mining activity is still 
ongoing at night. It is sure that those who will be mostly affected are the people who 
depend on this activity for their living.  
Main actors in coltan mining in the DRC are as follows (figure 2).It is thus not just a 
conflict over mining activities. Resource rents can be accrued throughout a number of 
subsequent transportation stages and intermediaries at local markets within the 
region. The number of actors involved (see graph) and the fact that official 
representatives and armed groups often cooperate make up for an intransparent 
situation. Even like-minded actors have difficulties to get evidence on whether any 
permission or certificate is legally correct and complies with basic laws. As a result, 
many actors benefit from the current situation, and there is hardly an incentive to 
change this from within: a self-perpetuating lock-in situation within a fragile state. 
Figure 2: The supply chain of coltan for electronics industry 
Source: Own compilation, OECD (2010), Resolve (2010), Garrett and Mitchell (2009), Global Witness 
(2009), TIC (2010), UN reports (2008, 2010), Enough! (2009).  
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4.  Coltan and international trade: dimension and actors  
Tantalum materials are not openly traded; there is no stock market or spot market 
where prices could be compared. Purchase contracts are confidential between buyer 
and seller. Current data evidence reveals that Central Africa has become the major 
supplier for coltan / tantalum on world markets in 2009/10 – and possibly even earlier. 
However any estimation of the total amount of coltan produced in the DRC and traded 
internationally is limited by data availability, comparability and reliability as well as by 
difficulties of tracing illegal trade in Eastern Congo. Thus, tracing any illicit trade and 
estimating the real amount of coltan produced in and exported by DRC remains a 
central challenge. 
The following part of our paper starts from the assumption that any illicit trade with 
coltan sooner or later enters the markets and is hence reflected in statistics 
downstream. Going beyond inconsistencies of DRC data, two possible gateways for 
such laundry mechanisms will be investigated:8 
1. Neighbouring countries: they may declare exports that are not entirely covered 
by adding up domestic production and imports (and possible stockpiles). 
2. Importing countries: especially huge economies may declare imports that are 
not equal to exports of that respective country.9 
Our paper calculates coltan exports of DRC based on the information of those trading 
partners who reported to UN Comtrade10; this is compared with other available 
estimations (Roskill 2009, USGS 2011, UN Expert Report 2008, Global Witness 2009, 
Garrett/Mitchell 2009). We use mass units because they are not biased by monetary 
valuation and price volatilities.11 Due to the fact that not all countries report their 
trade, bilateral trade results have to be considered as minimum exports from DRC.  
In addition, trade of coltan from DRC is estimated by analysing the trade flows of the 
neighbouring countries in the African Great Lake region, especially Rwanda, which 
have been mentioned as preferred trade routes of illicit trade with coltan and other 
minerals (e.g. Garrett/Johnson 2008; Garrett/Mitchell 2009; Global Witness 2009, 
2010; UN Expert Panel 2008). 
                                                          
8
 Potentially it might also be interesting to assess business reports since coltan / tanatalum is input to 
specialized capacitor production with few producers worldwide it might be possible to get evidence for 
inconsistencies. But the data availability in that area is too poor yet. 
9
 We refer, for example, to the comparison between exports figures from DRC and import figures from 
China. 
10
 The  R  hasn’t been reporting trade figures to international organisations since 1987. 
11
 See e.g. Dittrich (2009) on the physical dimension of international trade. 
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Available data give apparent evidence that DRC has been increasingly producing and 
exporting coltan especially since 2006 (see figure 3a and 3b). Trade data doesn’t 
specify content and concentration of the ores and concentrates; but the results are in 
line with other studies referring to gross mass of tantalum / niobium production. USGS 
(2011: 52.13) shows an increasing production from 52t (2006) up to 267t (2007), 380t 
(2008) and 330t (2009, gross mass). While Roskill (2009) does not quantify tantalum 
production of DRC separately, Global Witness (2009) quoting official government 
statistics from North and South Kivu reveals that 428.4 t of coltan (gross mass) were 
exported in 2007 and at least 270.79 t in the first half of 2008. The UN Expert Report 
2008 estimates that DRC produced and exported at least 393 t in 2007 and 300 t 
between January and July 2008. Finally, a study by Garrett and Mitchell (2009) sums up 
the official figures12 from North and South Kivu for 2007 and 2008 (total + December 
estimate) and adds to these data a 35% estimation based on calculations on transport 
volumes.  
Figure 3a: Estimated production and aggregated trade of coltan ores of DR Congo, 
1996 - 2009 
 
Sources: UNComtrade (here and in the following: SITC-3-28785; please note: the classification includes 
tantalum, niobium and vanadium; numbers don’t specify content and concentration of ores and 
concentrates. In line with other sources we assume that DRC does not export vanadium ores and the 
share of niobium and tantalum is around 50 : 50); USGS (2011) and various years; gross mass is mass of 
concentrate before metal is extracted; UN Expert Report 2008 (2008 only Jan-July); Global Witness 2009 
(2008 only first half); Garrett/Mitchell 2009. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 The sources of data are Division des Mines of North Kivu and the private sector federation of Bukavu 
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Figure 3b: trade of coltan ores of DR Congo by trading partners, 1996 – 2009 
 
 
Sources: UNComtrade; *Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Rep. of Korea; **Brazil, Germany, Estonia, 
Belgium; ***South Africa, Uganda (each in order of relevance).  
The values obtained are 360 t for 2007 and 517 t for 2008. These data differ by some 47 % 
(USGS vs. UN Expert Panel in 2007) and 36% (USGS vs. Garret/Mitchell in 2008), and show 
clearly an upward production trend. 
In 2009, bilateral trade data (see fn 7) indicates that DRC exports mount up to a 
minimum of 275 t with a value of around 4 million US$ – comparable to the combined 
production of Brazil and Australia in that year.  
As mentioned above, Rwanda is deemed to be the preferred trade route for illegally 
traded minerals financing the conflict parties for several reasons. Besides geographical 
reasons, exports of tantalum concentrates aren’t taxed in Rwanda while  R  has been 
taxing official mineral exports. Thus, trade via Rwanda is more profitable than legal 
exports via Kinshasa (Garrett/ Johnson 2008). According to Rwandan law, imported 
minerals could be declared as minerals produced in Rwanda if they are further 
processed in Rwanda and enhanced in value of about 30%. Thus, coltan imported from 
DRC to Rwanda could be legally exported as coltan from Rwanda without separating 
whether it was imported legally or illegally. Global Witness (2010: 13) even goes as far 
as to name Rwanda a laundering centre in international trade. 
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Though Mozambique is according to USGS (2011) the most important producer of 
tantalum ores in Central Africa,13 Rwanda is the most important exporter of tantalum 
and niobium in Central Africa14 supplying around 75 % of all exported ores and 
concentrates of these metals in 2009 according to trade statistics. A comparison of 
trade and production information for Rwanda shows remarkable inconsistencies15 (see 
figure 4). Obvious are high net-exports compared to very moderate production figures.  
Figure 4: Estimated coltan production and trade of Rwanda and Central African 
Countries 
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Net-exports of CAC according to trade partners*
Production of tantalum and niobium (USGS, gross mass) 
Production of tantalum ores in Rwanda (USGS, tantalum content)
Production of niobium ores in Rwanda (USGS, niobium content)
Chinese imports from Rwanda*
Imports of tantalum minerals from Rwanda (Roskill, gross mass)
[metric tonnes]
 
Sources: UNComtrade, USGS; *Unspecified contents of tantalum, niobium and vanadium ores and 
concentrates.  
                                                          
13
 TI  (2010) refers to misreporting of production figures in Mozambique.  omparing Mozambique’s 
trade data, our analysis is that relevant difference occurs in trade with USA; USA imports around 50 – 80 
t more according to its own trade data than according to Mozambique’s trade information in 2007 – 
2009. 
14
 Burundi, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Uganda Zambia, Zimbabwe. Note: none of these countries are mentioned in USGS as important 
producer of vanadium; therefore it can be assumed that data quantify tantalum and niobium ores and 
concentrates. Worldwide,  razil is main supplier for niobium (≈ 95 % of the world market). 
15
 Analyzing production and trade data of Mozambique, Kenya and Uganda also brings to light 
incoherencies which could be indicating (partly or fully) illicit trade from DRC but they are minor 
compared to Rwandan statistics. 
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However because of different definitions of tantalum ores and concentrates in UN 
Comtrade and USGS statistics (see fn 7), the mathematical difference should be 
interpreted with caution. Eye-catching is the rising gap between Rwanda’s information 
on exports and the information given by the trading partners since 2006. According to 
Rwanda’s sources, it imports 131 t of tantalum and niobium ores from  R  in 2009 
with a value of around $ 1.1 million, and exports around 949 t of tantalum with a value 
of around $ 18 million. According to its trade partners, however, Rwanda’s net-exports 
of these ores and concentrates amount up to 3.195 t with a value of $ 41 million in 
2009. The difference of a factor 3.3 in production and 2.3 in value is striking but the 
interpretation is not unambiguous. The data seems to indicate an increasing illicit trade since 
2005 from Rwanda for an amount that could hardly be quantified exactly.16 However the 
differences could also be caused (partly) by double-counting and implausible data reported by 
importing countries17, most importantly Chinese imports that dominate the figure. 
There is no doubt that a regional shift of trade pattern can be observed: during the 
nineties, western countries had been the dominant importers of coltan from DRC. 
Since 2000, Asian countries, most dominantly China, increasingly import coltan directly 
from DRC. This goes in line with the overall increase of trade between African 
countries on the one hand and on the other hand China and other developing 
countries who are investing predominantly in resource rich African countries (UNCTAD, 
2010). According to data from the Congolese Ministry of mines collected by the NGO 
Global Witness (2010), the coltan imported by China constitutes 60 % of the North and 
South  ivu’s production. In 2009, China has purchased 121 t of coltan (most probably: 
gross mass) with a value of around 2.6 million US$ directly from DRC. 
China is also by far the most important importer of tantalum produced in the Central 
African region. Since 2000, China’s imports of tantalum and niobium ores from this 
region rose from 435 t or 11.3 million US$ to 3.154 t with a value of 36.3 million US$ in 
2009. Direct imports from DRC are minor compared to other suppliers, among which 
the most relevant is Rwanda (see figure 5). In physical terms, China imported around 
73 % of all exported tantalum and niobium ores of the region (assuming that vanadium 
is rather negligible).  
Roskill (2009: 105) reports 1,656 t of imported tantalum minerals from Rwanda in 2008  
– roughly 4,6 times the amount of Rwanda’s production according to USGS (2011: 
52.13, 120 t ta content ≈ 490 t gross mass).  Roskill’s numbers, based on private sector 
information, lies between Rwanda’s information of its net-exports of ores and 
concentrates of tantalum as well as niobium and information of trading partners about 
                                                          
16
 See also Global Witness (2010: 13) on Rwanda and cassiterite from DRC. 
17
 Differences in monetary values may also (partly) be caused by different use of INCOTERMS: cif (=cost, 
Insurance freight) values are often used for imports, fob (free on board) values are often used for 
exports. However in our view this cannot capture such differences. 
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its net-imports of these ores and concentrates from Rwanda. If one assumes an import 
from  R  in the order of 131 t (data for 2008, including ca. 50 % niobium ores ≈ 262 t 
gross mass), the difference is significant. Their report also estimates main smuggling 
activities via Rwanda. With all uncertainties involved, one may thus estimate that 914 t 
of these minerals might stem from illicit trade – a share of some 55 %. 
Compared to other importers like Hong  ong or Singapore,  hina’s imports have a 
significantly lower price ($ 11.33 per kilogram tantalum and niobium ore versus $ 
24.26 paid by other Asian importers). In this context, it is also interesting to note that 
prices for coltan from DRC have been increasing since 2007 while prices have been 
rather decreasing for exports from the other countries in this region. Prices for coltan 
imported from Rwanda had been constantly low. In 2009 China purchased coltan for 
even less than $ 8 per kilogram according to its trade report while coltan exports from 
Rwanda costs between $ 13 and 31 per kilogram on a monthly average, depending on 
tantalum grades18. Roskill (2009: 148) reports that the average price of  hina’s imports 
from Rwanda has been 2 – 2.7 times lower than the import price of Australian 
tantalite. In the first half of 2009 it was 3.7 times lower. Not neglecting different 
qualities (see fn 7, these enormous differences can be assumed as key reasons for the 
strong position of Rwandaas a trade hub, the shifting of capacitor manufacturing to 
China, and the currently miserable situation of the conventional supply chain of 
tantalum. And, indeed, it fuels illegal and criminal activities of all kinds.  
Following the estimation of around 900 tonnes illicit trade in the most recent year and 
assuming similar price ranges for coltan from DRC and Rwanda results in a loss of 
potential income in the order of between $ 12 and 28 million for DRC in that year.19 
This is a significant amount in a country, which ranges at the bottom of development 
rankings (HDI position 187 out of 187, UNDP 2011). On top of that one would also have 
to add loss of revenues from other illegal mineral exports. 
The typical supply chain of coltan produced in DRC and sold by illegitimate means thus 
looks as follows: it is exported via Rwanda or other Central African Countries, and is 
bought by Chinese processors. These processors are often smaller companies who do 
not have pressure to disclose information or to report. They, in turn, produce and 
export downstream products such as K-salt used to make capacitor-grade powder. 
Those products do enter the global market while their origins are obscured. 
According to the official statistics reported by Global Witness (2010), three Chinese 
companies figure among the main importers of coltan from the Kivus in 2009: Fogng 
Jiata Metals, Star 2000 Services and Unilink Trading Hong Kong. The latest UN report 
                                                          
18
 Personal information by Philip Schütte, BGR. 
19
 See also Nest (2011: 94) and the calculation of $ 11,8 million in 2008 as estimated profit for armed 
groups. 
Coltan from Central Africa, International Trade and Implications for Any Certification 
 
15 
 
(2010) doesn’t consider these companies as involved in the minerals trade from areas 
controlled by armed groups, but it is unclear how the Chinese government intends to 
meet any responsibilities in such trade.  
Figure 5: China’s imports of tantalum and niobium from selected African countries 
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Source: UN Comtrade (SITC-3-28785) 
 
The case of CNMC Ningxia Orient Nonferrous Metal Group seems illustrative for these 
concerns. The state-owned enterprise is one of the world’s top three smelters and 
producers of tantalum. The tantalum it produces is used by the largest capacitor 
manufacturers such as the US based AVX, that in turn supply electronics to companies 
such as  ell, Intel and RIM (‘ lackberry’) and Hewlett-Packard. Although the company 
claims to have transparent sourcing practices, Global Witness (2010) has raised 
concerns that the K-salt20 that the company uses to produce tantalum and that it 
claims to come from refineries in China, can be used to cover the Congolese origin of 
the tantalum they use. Nathan / Sarkar (2010: 23) claim that Ningxia continues to 
import coltan from DRC despite all concerns. Ningxia has not responded to a 
questionnaire that was done by Resolve (2010: 39) in a attempt to address supply 
chain challenges for electronics industry and their use of critical metals.21 It is also 
                                                          
20
 K-salt is tantalum ore that has been chemically refined to make the compound called potassium 
tantalum fluoride 
21
 According to Resolve (2010: 39), all major producers of electronic goods responded on tantalum 
(Apple, Dell, HP, IBM, and others), roughly half of the component manufacturers, only one of the 
processors (Cabot), and none of the actors involved in earlier stages (except Talison, the Australian 
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interesting to see that capacitor production in China and exports thereof have been 
increasing rapidly over the previous few years, meaning that any supply chain 
management with certification rests more and more upon the credibility of China. 
5.  Lessons for any certification scheme and better resource 
governance 
Our analysis reveals inconsistencies in tantalum data and indicates a remarkable scope 
for hiding illicit trade. Both the neighboring countries and the Chinese gateway show a 
dimension according to which the total amount of coltan traded may outweigh the 
official DRC production, possibly by a factor of three. This magnitude is in line with UN 
expert group estimations that have been done domestically in the DRC in 2008 and 
2010 and trade data. To illustrate this: if one assumes illegitimite imports from 
DRC/Rwanda to China in the dimension of 914 t (gross weight 2008, see above, not to 
mention other illicit routes) and a market price of $ 87 / kg Ta2O5, the value of such 
illicit trade of tantalum comes close to $ 27 million annually,22 roughly one fifth of the 
estimated world market volume for tantalum production. Though these gateways are 
merely a first indication and not a robust result yet, the result gives an impression of 
the potential revenues from coltan mining in DRC if coltan would be traded 
transparently and legally.  
Production and trade data on minerals involved in armed conflicts are needed in an 
internationally comparable scheme with open access, supported by reliable national 
and regional reporting requirements. This should include detailed information about 
local origin, prices and ore concentrations. In the short term, it could be organized by 
an international group of experts in charge with collecting, comparing and evaluating 
available data, including data on international trade.23 In the medium term, it would be 
favorable to harmonize international statistical methods and classifications, and to 
develop full material flow accounts including secondary production and recycling as 
well as financial flows.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
mining company). The study was done on behalf of the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) and the 
Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC). 
22
 Calculated as follows: 914 (difference between imports acc. to Roskill 2008 and exports) : 3 (weight 
factor for Ta2O5) x 87,000 ($ acc. to Popp, USGS 2011) 
23
 Indeed it should include the data provided from recent efforts such as ICGLR certification and 
initiatives that might follow the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and the European  ommission’s 
proposals (see annex). 
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Despite all uncertainties regarding data, however, analysis can draw useful lessons for 
any certification scheme. The following three governance challenges become obvious.  
Firstly, Central Africa including the DRC and Mozambique is now the largest supplier of 
coltan / tantalum on world markets. Our short analysis of the DRC reaffirms that major 
actors in the region cooperate in their efforts to profit from mining and trading coltan. 
The conflict structure is dominated by rent-seeking activities of a number of actors 
over all stages of the supply chain until it enters official markets, not just by fighting 
over mining licences. The involvement of DRC officials, the ability to earn incomes 
higher than average as well as the desperate situation of the local population, 
triggered by high world market demand and no transparency requirements, favor a 
rather perverse stability of such situation. Any certification scheme thus should take 
into account the ability of all actors involved to mix legal mining products with others 
along the first stages of the supply chain.  
Secondly, coltan (tantalum) has interesting characteristics for a number of technology 
applications. Focusing on one application (e.g. mobile phones) may raise awareness 
but bears the risks of shifting production patterns to other technology areas where 
public attention is comparatively low. In addition, focusing on a limited number of 
conflict minerals gives incentives for shifting illegitimate activities to other profitable 
minerals. The scope thus should cover all applications and all commodities from 
conflict regions. 
Thirdly, the involvement of China, other Asian countries and production located there 
lead to international governance challenges while transparency is poor. The large 
number of small producers for a number of tantalum products such as K-salt and 
tantalum powder makes it fairly difficult to establish a reliable certification scheme. 
Moreover, the international dimension adds un-intended negative effects to 
certification schemes: if like-minded producers manage to establish a sustainable 
supply chain management for a number of commodities (however difficult this may 
be!), their competitors and other value chains will benefit. With growing markets in 
Africa and Asia that do not have to comply with any certification in the US or in the EU 
this is a real risk. Economics supports such argument: a split demand results in a split 
price and split awareness, i.e. higher prices for those concerned and lower prices for 
those who do not care. Probably, the conflict situation wouldn’t change much! 
Governance challenges for certification thus relate to feasibility and reliability, to the 
scope, and to the international dimension. Above all, one should conclude that 
certification efforts should be accompanied be profound reforms in governance.   
A two track approach of pilots on the region and capacitor-based certification may 
yield results. Since capacitor manufacturers consume roughly half of the tantalum 
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world-wide and have a strong position in the supply chain, more attention should be 
focused here. The regional certification scheme developed by the ICGLR (International 
Conference of the Great Lakes Region) is a useful initiative in that regard. The 
mechanism, which had been formally adopted by the ICGLR heads of state, covers 
cassiterite, coltan, wolframite and gold and aims at achieving compatibility with other 
initiatives, such as ITSCi (Initiative of the Tin Smelting Capacitor Industry), GeSI (Global 
electronics Sustainability Initiative) and EICC (Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition). 
Its main elements are chain of custody tracking from mine to export at country level,24 
regional tracking of mineral flows through the creation of a database on their 
purchases, independent audits on all actors in the supply chain and a monitoring of the 
whole mineral chain by a Mineral Chain Auditor (Blore and Smillie, 2011). Compliance 
with certification schemes and data disclosure in their business reports is a key; third 
party audits, as suggested by OECD (2010), will improve reliability. Public offerings at 
regional stock exchanges may be options for the future. In particular it would help in 
the establishment of an international comprehensive monitoring mechanism and any 
enforcement.  
These certification initiatives are taking advantage of the Kimberley Process for the 
certification of diamonds. Important lessons cover the purpose, administrative and 
operational aspects (Blore and Smillie, 2011).25 Following Haufler (2010) the elements 
of establishing inclusive and relatively strong institutions can be seen as key elements 
for success as well as market leverage in industrialized countries. The conclusion 
indeed is that administrative capacity building in the region with independent auditing 
will be a key to establish reliable evidence and to fight corruption. However, coltan 
differs from diamonds because 
1. The number of actors involved upstream and their ability to mix illegitimate 
sources with legal ones during the first stages of the supply chain are huge; 
centralizing traders and monitoring 100% of their operations should be useful; 
2. The security situation in the region remains fragile; 
3. The production chain downstream is much more complex and entirely globalized, 
with Chinese companies being in the largest position; 
4. Tantalum is not an end-product in itself, many companies are unaware yet 
whether it is a component in one of their products, and consumers have 
difficulties to realize it either.  
                                                          
24
 This aspect includes the emission of a regional certificate to ensure that mineral don’t originate from 
conflict areas or are not illegally transferred among countries. 
25
 Concerning the purpose, the system needs a flexible approach and objectives should also aim at 
incorporating longer-term goals of governance, development and ethical practices. As for the 
administrative aspects, the system should cover the whole supply chain, ensure transparency and 
inclusive decision-making, and include a strong administrative structure to manage it. Finally, 
operational aspects include ensuring that production sites are free from militia/armed forces, databases 
on production-exports of minerals, independent third party monitoring and follow up of problems, 
credible sanctions for defectors (Blore and Smillie, 2010). 
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Thus a better coordination among international approaches to promote legal mineral 
trade is at stake. Table 1 (see Annex) reports relevant initiatives. Attempts to promote 
transparency should generally be supported because they have positive side-effects on 
markets and against corruption; however better coordination and harmonisation of 
data is a key to minimize overlaps and unproductive information overflow. 
International initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
coincide with legislation such as the Dodd-Frank Act in the USA26 and the proposals of 
the European Commission to introduce transparency and accountability obligations for 
large public and not-public companies in the extractive and forestry sectors. The two 
legal initiatives may also have triggered the recent statement by the Congolese 
government to require „all organisations and individuals involved in the mining, 
transportation, sale, processing and export of the four conflict minerals“ to introduce 
due diligence practices along their value chain (Global Witness, 11th October 2011).27  
This proves that voluntary efforts should be supported by international law to promote 
transparency, certification and accountability against corruption and in favour of 
sustainability. Following a suggestion made by Collier and Venables (2010: 15), the 
anti-bribery legislation that the OECD now requires of its membership could be a 
requirement of WTO membership – a compliance issue for China and elsewhere. In the 
long run, an international agreement on sustainable resource management might also 
be an option (Bleischwitz 2009). 
A two track approach of pilots on the region and capacitor-based certification as 
outlined above should also be accompanied by better governance at both the national 
and regional level. As Mitchell and Garrett (2010) claim the general conditions and 
social sector reforms in Eastern DRC are urgent preconditions for any progress.  
As regards to prices and taxation, most researchers share the impression that the 
current systems neither capture negative externalities nor do they promote regional 
sustainable development. A general assessment and review of the DRC tax system with 
emphasis on simplification, transparency and accountability as well as raw material 
taxation at the extraction point would not only generate revenues but also give 
financing opportunities and incentives for value adding activities in the region 
(Garrett/ Mitchell/ Lintzer 2010). However tax competition with neighbouring 
countries (e.g. Rwanda) should be minimized via agreements – the EU offers a lot of 
practical guidance on how coordination can work. Such taxation also helps to 
establishing an appropriate legal order and could give more social security to mining 
workers and along the regional supply chain.  
                                                          
26
 In November 2011 a Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade has been launched in the 
US to support the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act 
27
 Companies or individuals not complying within 45 days will be imposed administrative sanctions e.g. 
withdrawal of business licenses (Global Witness, 11th October 2011). 
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Ensuring that the profit from the mining sector trickles down to the local population 
with value creating activities may benefit from the establishment of an independent 
and accountable resource management fund. A regional resource fund where money 
of different donors and actors involved (public and private) can be pooled, could help 
ensuring better coordination among different actions, better allocation of investments 
and better division of the tasks. In addition, an improved and effective mining law that 
could be implemented with international support until the actual resource conflict is 
solved should be considered.28  
UNCTAD (2008, 2010) suggests linking revenues of rising commodity prices 
strategically to developing goals such as infrastructure, education, health care or 
economic diversification, using even bilateral trade agreements in this context, e.g. by 
exporting raw materials for the construction of infrastructure. This could mean that 
the DRC extends the existing formal trade with China and other countries using their 
interest in coltan and other raw materials in order to finance governmental presence 
and (re-) build public infrastructure and improve processing capacities in its eastern 
parts. Further analysis may also shed light on the role of a development state and 
implications for any sustainable growth to contest the theory of a resource curse in 
this region (Collier / Goderis 2007; Gylfason 2009; World Bank 2008). 
6.  Conclusions 
Our analysis of international trade statistics reveals a significant amount of illicit coltan 
in the order of some 20 % on world markets (2009/10).  At the heart of any solution 
should be the insight that markets need transparency and appropriate prices – 
safeguarded by proper institutions – to function properly. Illicit trade, intransparency 
and corruption are to be seen as major risks for the local population and for business. 
Market failures are likely to have substantial costs, in particular for a region like 
eastern DRC, but also for the market itself.  
However a common interest for comprehensive solutions exists and stems from the 
critical need for such metals both in high-tech industries as well as in most countries. 
Australian mining company Talison is ready to re-enter the market as soon as current 
uncertainties will be reduced. Thus our estimation that current efforts to establish 
certification may have the unwanted side-effect of negative impacts in the eastern 
DRC should also lead to support for better governance in the region and in markets for 
minerals. Chinese companies, and in particular state-owned enterprises, should accept 
their responsibility to perform supply chain due diligence. Efforts to promote 
                                                          
28
 Satellite fotos in military quality of the conflict areas can be useful in that regard. Garrett and Lintzer 
(2010) give arguments why the national government should further retire from extraction activities. 
Discussing the role of the UN as well as legal frameworks is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) with its 
focal point China may help to level the playing field.29 
Further analysis will also have to develop governance mechanisms to turn illicit trade 
in minerals into opportunities for sustainable development. This will not only require 
harmonized data and monitoring, but also capacity building initiatives and 
enforcement systems for the main stakeholders as well as better institutions such as 
resource taxation systems. As expressed above, new international legal and economic 
mechanisms should be established. In that regard, the current barriers and deficits 
might be removed by international incentives for re-use and recycling: material 
stewardship is an encouraging concept where capacitor producers currently are key 
business actors. They should be part of a future international covenant for the 
recycling of critical metals that involves in particular electronics industry (Wilts / 
Bleischwitz 2011). Aim in this context is to increase industrial recycling, to collect more 
consumer goods and to establish recycling facilities internationally. Such covenant is 
well in line with high prices for primary resources as well as with fair trade. 
This is, of course, an agenda that goes beyond the scope of our case study. Having said 
this however the authors also wish to express the view that bans are a less desirable 
option because they would result in further economic hardship for the Congolese 
people. Putting the raw material conflict issue in the framework of sustainable 
resource management and international governance for trade in natural resources 
probably is a better way forward. 
                                                          
29
 See e.g. the reporting requirements for mining companies at: www.globalreporting.org and e.g. 
www.csreurope.org for efforts to promote Corporate Social Responsibility. 
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Annex- international initiatives and coverage of the value chain of coltan 
Initiative Action description Actors 
responsible 
Part of supply chain  Synergies with other 
actions 
Relevance for Central Africa Risks 
UN-EU partnership on 
natural industries and 
conflict prevention 
Aims at ensuring inclusion of 
conflict prevention and 
sensitivity in NRM programs. It 
provides a framework and 
technical assistance useful to EU 
and UN agencies to plan and 
design intervention strategies 
where extractive industries are 
driving factors of the conflict 
EU and UN UN and the EU, 
extractive 
industries, 
governments  
EITI, capacity 
building/technical 
assistance 
DRC is one of the country of operation. Although 
Guidance Notes, training manuals, and online self-
paced learning tool are available, it will not benefit 
from training modules for UN and EU field staff, as 
well as local partners, which will take place in four 
pilot countries: Timor Leste, Liberia, Peru and 
Guinea-Conakry. However, in 2008 UNEP 
established a Country Programme aiming “to assist 
the government of DR Congo in its post-conflict 
recovery and sustainable development”  
contribution of other key parties 
is needed in order to achieve a 
peaceful outcome in a 
coordinated and constructive 
manner 
EITI, EITI++ 
 
disclosure of public 
revenues/expenses 
Governments 
and companies 
Local companies 
(comptoires/mining 
companies) 
Capacity building 
programmes, initiatives 
supporting transparency in 
the value 
chain(certification/chain of 
custody assurance) 
DRC was accepted as candidate country in 2008. In 
2011 its Candidate status was renewed by the EITI 
Board. In March 2013 the country will be required 
to comply with the 2011 edition of the EITI Rules 
for EITI Validation for. Zambia, Mozambique and 
Tanzania are the other Candidate countries in the 
region 
It covers only one part of a 
broader resource management 
process. Problems in 
implementation due to the 
fragmentation of state 
organizations 
OECD/UN  
due diligence 
Due diligence framework and 
practical guidance on how to 
manage risks 
Up/down-
stream 
operators 
Up/down-stream 
operators 
Promotes the use of 
schemes for traceability 
(iTSCi), EITI 
The OECD, the ICGLR and the UN Group of Experts 
on the DRC are cooperating in the implementation 
of the Guidance in Africa's Great Lakes region. 
Currently, 82 companies and industry associations 
are volunteering taking part in the pilot 
Too burdensome requirements, 
might push companies from 
OECD countries out of the sector 
 apacity building of 
governments (e.g. 
Promines -
Programme int gr  et 
multisectoriel de 
d veloppement du 
secteur minier en RDC 
) 
Strengthening capacity of key institutions to 
manage mineral sector, improving condition for 
investment and socio-economic benefits 
L cal 
institutions, 
in ernational 
donors 
Local institutions, 
business 
environment 
Attends to gaps in EITI, 
supports the creation of 
traceability systems 
PROMINES was launched in 2009 in DRC Difficult implementation 
environment in the region (e.g. 
situation in DRC), limited 
resources for too wide scope 
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Certified Trading 
Chains (CTC) 
Ensure chain of custody for 
producers and buyers 
(verification of origin and trade 
volume analysis, independent 
audits); on-the-ground 
assessment of mining conditions 
BRG and the 
local ministry of 
mines (DRC, 
Rwanda) 
Mining production 
and trade (focus on 
companies’ 
concessions - LSM) 
Capacity building 
programmes, 
fingerprinting process 
Implementation of the scheme has been 
satisfactory in Rwanda. Concerning DRC, the pilot 
project in South Kivu is at an earlier stage. CTC 
offices have been created in Kinshasa and Bukavu 
and workshops held to better define the criteria 
for the implementation of the initiative 
Capacity building needed, 
multiple stakeholders involved 
can hamper the process 
iTSCi 
 
Ensure traceability of minerals 
(phase I- introduction of due 
diligence procedures, written 
documentation, independent 
audits; phase II- “bag and tag 
system” of traceability) 
Initiative of the 
tin smelting 
industry  
Suppliers and 
exporters of 
minerals (in 
particular ASM) 
Possible interaction with 
Capacity building 
programmes, EICC/GeSi, 
OECD/UN due diligence 
guidelines.  Could be 
integrated in CTC as 
traceability scheme. 
Pilot projects started in south Kivu in 2010, but 
have been stopped due to the mining suspension 
from September 2010. Since 2011, 
implementation phase in Rwanda and the 
southern DRC province of Katanga. The scheme 
may be extended to Burundi and Uganda, if 
funding is assured, and eventually the entire Great 
Lakes Region 
Security of mining sites, 
commercial visibility, need to 
publish data for awareness 
raising 
Analytical Fingerprint 
(AFP) 
Independent mineral traceability 
tool 
Up to now: BRG Mining and trade Forms part of CTC 
certification scheme; can 
be linked to iTCSi  
Pilot projects are being implemented in  Rwanda. 
The system is supposed to be extended to other 
ICGLR countries among which DRC 
Complex and costly 
implementation, stakeholders 
facilitation and institutional 
support needed 
Global e-
Sustainability 
Initiative and  
Electronic Industry 
Citizenship Coalition -  
Conflict-Free Smelter 
(CFS) protocol  
GeSI/ EICC  offer a tool relating to 
smelter due diligence 
requirements and support for 
certification of smelters.   
Initiative of 
electronics 
industry 
Smelters Link with mineral 
certification schemes 
(iTSCi and CTC) 
The mechanism concerns smelters sourcing from 
DRC and adjoining countries 
Complexity of ITC supply chain 
ICGLR certification 
scheme 
International Conference of  the 
Great Lakes Region, Regional 
certificate of origin scheme, 
harmonization, promotion of 
dialogue 
ICGLR Local 
producers/traders 
Complementarity with 
other point of origin 
certification schemes (CTC, 
iTSCi) 
DRC and Rwanda are member States of the ICGLR, 
together with Angola, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia. The countries are all 
signatories of the Regional Initiative against the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources providing 
the framework for actions in the domain of natural 
resources exploitation 
Ownership issues 
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Bans mining/export of the mineral is 
prevented 
Governments/ 
international 
community 
Extraction phase or 
exports from the 
producing country 
May be symbolic part of 
broader action 
A mining ban was instituted in DRC from 
September 2010 to March 2011 
Bringing further economic 
hardship for people , costly and 
difficult to enforce 
Dodd Frank act Legal obligation on US companies 
reporting to SEC to declare use of 
“conflict minerals” 
SEC, SEC 
reporting 
companies 
SEC reporting 
companies with 
activities in  
exploration, 
discovery, 
development and 
extraction, 
processing, export 
and other significant 
actions 
Due diligence guidelines 
and iTSCi 
Dodd Frank section 1502 is a disclosure 
requirement, concerning sourcing conflict minerals 
from DRC or adjoining countries 
 
Compliance issues, questionable 
impact on Congolese people. 
EC Accounting and 
Transparency 
Directives 
The rules of the Directives 
require extractive industry and 
forestry companies to declare 
payments (production 
entitlements, taxes or profit, 
royalties, dividends, license fees, 
other benefits to governments) 
to governments in every country 
they operate and on a project-by-
project base 
  
Listed and large 
or public 
interest non-
listed 
companies 
active in the 
extractive or 
logging 
industries  
Extractive and 
logging companies 
with activities in 
exploration, 
discovery, 
development and 
extraction phases 
EITI but also other 
certification schemes and 
due diligence guidelines 
The directives refer to companies in the extractive 
industry or forestry in whatever country they 
operate   
Debated points (covering 
companies in other sectors, 
disclosure of more information, 
elimination of exemptions, etc.). 
The proposal has to be approved 
by the European Parliament and 
Council and implemented in the 
Member States. 
Starec plan Rehabilitation and regulation of 
mining. Establishments of 
marketplaces (centres de 
negoce) in key mining areas 
Government of 
DRC, artisanal 
miners and 
their 
associations 
Traders, merchants, 
diggers, mineral and 
state authorities 
 The programme covers DRC Challenge on how to manage 
security  
Source: Authors’ elaboration of different sources. 
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